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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WATERTOWN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT/AFT #3091, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-18413 
WATERTOWN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
TIMOTHY FAY, for Charging Party 
ALFRED T. RICCIO, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Watertown Education 
Association, NYSUT/AFT #3091 (Association) to an "interim" decision by the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) on a 
charge against the Watertown City School District (District).1 The Association alleges in 
this charge that the District violated §209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when, on August 15, 1996, and again on September 11, 1996, it 
1Another charge (U-18414) filed by the Watertown Instructional Teacher 
Assistants Association, NYSUT/AFT #3937 was consolidated with this charge for 
decision. No exceptions have been taken to the Assistant Director's dismissal of that 
part of U-18414 relating to the September 11, 1996 change in health benefits. 
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unilaterally changed the health benefits of employees in the unit which the Association 
represents. 
The Assistant Director dismissed that part of the charge concerning the alleged 
September 11, 1996 change in health benefits because the Association had not filed 
Jhe_notice_ofxlaim_required_by_EducatiQn_Law^38.13..andJhe.DJstrict_had_nolrec.eiy.e.d 
the charge until one day after the three-month notice of claim period in Education Law 
§3813 had elapsed. The Assistant Director ordered the charge processed as to the 
alleged change in benefits made on August 15, 1996 because the Association had filed 
a timely notice of claim as to that alleged change.2 The Assistant Director rejected the 
Association's argument that its notice of claim filed regarding the August 15,1996 
'^ change in benefits should satisfy its notice of claim obligation regarding the 
September 11, 1996 change in benefits because the latter change was merely a 
continuation of the earlier unlawful change. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the Assistant Director was incorrect 
in treating the August 15 and September 11 changes in health benefits as separate 
claims of impropriety for notice of claim purposes. 
The District argues that the exceptions should not be considered because they 
were filed too late, but that the Assistant Director's decision is correct in any event and 
should be affirmed. 
2No exceptions have been taken to this aspect of the Assistant Director's 
decision. 
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Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we dismiss 
the exceptions as premature. 
The parties have proceeded upon an assumption that the exceptions to the 
Assistant Director's "interim" decision are filed as of right. They are not. The Assistant 
Director's-decision merely_reduced.iojivritin.g-.a_r.ul.ingj:egard.in.g_which_p.arts.-otthe 
charge would be processed. That ruling is no different in character than the great many 
other formal and informal rulings made during the processing of an improper practice 
charge. None of these preliminary rulings is subject to our review as of right until a 
decision on the charge is final. When, as here, proceedings are still pending before the 
Director, the Assistant Director or an Administrative Law Judge, appeal from a ruling 
adversely affecting a party is by permission only pursuant to §204.7(h)(2) of our Rules 
of Procedure (Rules). 
Our consistent interpretation of that rule, and its corollary pertaining to the 
processing of representation petitions,3 has been that permission to appeal from a 
ruling made incidental to the processing of a case will not be granted unless there are 
extraordinary circumstances warranting that review.4 No extraordinary circumstances 
are presented in a routine claim that a presiding officer's ruling is incorrect. Exceptions 
3Rules §201.9(c)(4). 
4United Transp. Union, Local 1440 (LoBianco), 31 PERB fl3027 (1998); Town of 
Shawangunk, 29 PERB 1J3050 (1996); State of New York (Goonewardena), 28 PERB 
113052(1995). 
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taken to the Assistant Director's ruling will be as of right upon his final disposition of the 
charge, if those exceptions comply with the applicable provisions of our Rules. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are dismissed as premature 
without reaching the merits of any of the parties' arguments. SO ORDERED. 
BATED: March 23, 1999.._ 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc AT Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POLICE ASSOCIATION OF GREENBURGH, INC., 
Charging PartyT 
- and - CASE NO. U-20350 
TOWN OF GREENBURGH, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS J. TROETTI, ESQ., for Charging Party 
VINCENT TOOMEY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Police Association of 
Greenburgh, Inc. (Association) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing, as deficient, a charge against the 
Town of Greenburgh (Town). The Association alleges in the charge, as twice 
amended, that the Town violated §209-a.1(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when the Town's Chief of Police, John Kapica, distributed to 
all employees in the Association's unit a June 16, 1998 memorandum he wrote in 
response to comments attributed to him by the Association's president, John Dee. At a 
meeting of the Association on May 14, 1998, Dee told the membership that Kapica had 
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referred to Dee and the Association's attorney as "sleazebags and shysters", a remark 
Dee characterized as "unprofessional". In his June 16 memorandum, Kapica gave his 
explanation of the circumstances for the comment he essentially admits having made. 
According to his memorandum, Kapica made the comment during a discussion about 
anAssociation grievance concerningiha vacation leave entitlementsjDlretired 
Detective Kevin Morgan. Kapica expressed an opinion that Dee violated the 
confidentiality of meetings between labor and management by revealing Kapica's 
comment to the membership. Kapica also explained in the memorandum why he 
thought the Morgan grievance had no merit and why it was a "contemptible 'act' rooted 
not in a deprivation of rights but of greed". 
\ The Director dismissed the alleged violations of §209-a.1(a), (b) and (c) of the 
Act upon his conclusion that Kapica's memorandum was not threatening or coercive in 
tone or content despite it being "to some extent vitriolic in nature". The Director did not 
address, however, the alleged §209-a.1(d) allegation raised under the second 
amendment to the charge filed in November 1998. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the Director erred in accepting as 
true the assertion in Kapica's memorandum that his remark about Dee and the 
Association's attorney was made at a meeting about the Morgan grievance. The 
Association reasserts that Kapica's remark was made at a meeting involving 
disciplinary charges at which the Morgan grievance was not even discussed. The 
Association argues that Kapica used Dee's revelation to the membership about the 
.J remark Kapica had made about him and the Association's attorney as an excuse to 
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threaten unit employees about pursuing or supporting the Morgan grievance or bringing 
other similar grievances and to deal directly with them on those subjects. 
The Town, which represents that Kapica did make his remark about Dee and the 
Association's attorney during a discussion about the Morgan grievance, argues that the 
Director-wasxorrect in_dismissingjthe_charge because Kapica's memorandum..does._.not 
set forth any violation of the Act as a matter of law. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision and also dismiss the §209-a.1(d) allegation which was not decided 
by the Director. 
It appears from the Director's decision that he believed that Kapica's remarks 
\ about Dee and the Association's attorney were made during a discussion about the 
Morgan grievance. That conclusion, however, is contrary to the Association's 
allegation, which must be assumed to be true for purposes of the Director's initial 
review of the charge.1 Assuming that Kapica's remarks about Dee and the 
Association's attorney were made during a meeting on disciplinary charges, as the 
Association alleges, and not during a discussion about the Morgan grievance, the 
charge still fails to set forth a violation of the Act. 
The Association's §209-a.1(a), (b) and (c) allegations are grounded upon a claim 
that Kapica's June 16 memorandum was an effort to dissuade Morgan from pursuing 
his grievance and to dissuade others in the unit from supporting that grievance and 
1
 Jacob Javits Convention Ctr. of New York, 20 PERB j[3030 (1987), aff'g 19 
-
J
 PERB 1J4626 (1986). 
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from filing similar grievances by "poisoning" the membership's support for those 
grievances and "assaulting" the legitimacy of those grievances and the integrity of the 
Association's representatives. We do not agree with the Association's characterization 
of Kapica's memorandum. 
Kapica'scomments about Dee-and4heAssociation's^attorney-are-notalleged-by 
the Association to be improper. Even if those comments were not made during a 
discussion of the Morgan grievance, Kapica was still privileged to express his opinion 
about the Morgan grievance in his June 16 memorandum. The issue is whether 
Kapica's statements in the June 16 memorandum about the Morgan grievance were 
threatening or otherwise unlawful, not when or why he made the remark about Dee and 
the Association's attorney. 
Both parties to a bargaining relationship have substantial privileges under the 
Act to communicate their opinions regarding employment issues to persons outside of 
that immediate bargaining relationship, including unit employees. The "labor relations 
process must tolerate robust debate of employment issues, even if occasionally 
intemperate."2 Specifically with respect to employer speech, we have held that an 
employer may communicate directly with unit employees about employment issues so 
long as the communication does not contain threats of reprisal for their exercise of 
2Village of Scotia, 29 PERB 1f3071, at 3170 (1996) (protecting employee speech 
against disciplinary consequence). 
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protected rights and does not promise them benefits for refraining from exercising those 
rights.3 
In assessing whether any speech violates the Act, we reject the Association's 
argument that the speaker's subjective intent or the recipient's subjective reaction to it 
_. is relevant. ^rhetestforwhetherspeechviolates-the-Actisa-purely objective one.-With 
employer speech, we examine only whether a reasonable employee would view the 
speech as threatening or coercive in the context in which the speech is delivered. To 
hold otherwise would make a party's right to speak dependent upon the reaction of the 
most sensitive person in the group to whom the speech is addressed, an obviously 
unsatisfactory standard producing results inconsistent with the policies of the Act 
) favoring "robust debate" of employment issues. 
Kapica's June 16 memorandum could not be threatening or coercive to a 
reasonable employee reading it. The memorandum repeatedly makes it clear that 
Kapica's remarks reflect only his personal opinion about what he considers to be a 
meritless grievance. He refers to the Association's right to bring grievances for its 
members and he states specifically that he "recognize[s] and fully supportfs] the 
Association's right to bring a grievance when they suspect a violation of the contract 
has occurred . . . ." Kapica's memorandum further makes it clear that the disparaging 
remarks attributed to him by Dee "were not meant to describe either President Dee or 
the PBA's counsel personally but rather their tactics in this particular situation." No 
3E.g., CityofYonkers, 23 PERB 1J3055 (1990). 
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reasonable employee reading Kapica's memorandum would believe that they were 
being threatened should the Morgan grievance proceed or should other grievances like 
it be filed in the future. The unit employees surely understood after reading the 
memorandum that Kapica thought the Morgan grievance had no merit, that he 
questioned the motives-of-the-personsresponsible for that grievance, andthathe was 
both angered and disappointed by what he considered to have been Dee's breach of 
trust. That, however, does not make the memorandum even arguably improper. 
The expression of opinion alone is not unlawful even if the effect of that 
expression is to cause a grievance to be dropped or others never to be filed.4 If the 
Association believed that Kapica's comments about the Morgan grievance were 
"•<! inaccurate or out of context, it could have responded to his memorandum. To make 
unlawful employer speech which is not accompanied by improper threats or promises 
would raise serious constitutional issues and would be inconsistent with the policies of 
the Act. In the latter regard, we have protected a wide variety of speech by employees 
and union officers.5 Employer speech which is devoid of threat or promise deserves 
similar protection lest we unbalance the parties' bargaining and grievance relationships. 
The Director did not address the direct dealing allegation raised by the second 
amendment to the charge. No point is served by remanding this refusal to bargain 
ACity of Albany, 17 PERB113068, aff'g 17 PERB 1J4525 (1984). 
5State of New York (Dep't of Correctional Servs.), 31 PERB 1J3072 (1998); 
Plainedge Union Free Sen. Dist, 31 PERB 1J3063 (1998); Village of Scotia, supra note 
, 2, cont'd, 241 A.D.2d 29, 31 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dep't 1998); Binghamton City Sch. Dist, 
22 PERB 1(3034 (1998); Plainedge Pub. Sch., 13 PERB 1J3037 (1980). 
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allegation to the Director at this time, however, because that allegation is now before us 
and it is deficient as a matter of law upon the facts as presented. 
Kapica's memorandum contains nothing even suggesting that grievances would 
be adjusted in any way other than through the Association. Indeed, the text of the 
-memorandum isJo thexontrary_Moreover,„Kapica made_a„settlement_proposaLto Dee__ 
affecting the Morgan grievance on June 17, 1998, a fact completely inconsistent with 
any direct dealing violation. As the charge does not contain any facts evidencing a 
refusal to negotiate on a direct dealing theory, or any other, that aspect of the charge is 
also properly dismissed. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: March 23, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
J7 c/ Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DORIS TOSHUNBE, 
Gharging-Pa-rtyT 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20529 
BUFFALO BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
Respondent. 
DORIS TOSHUNBE, pro se 
~) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Doris Toshunbe to a decision by 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
her charge which alleges that the Buffalo Board of Education (District) violated 
§209-a.1(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by instituting 
disciplinary charges against her which resulted in a two-week suspension. Toshunbe 
was notified that the charge, as filed and as amended, was deficient. She declined to 
withdraw the charge and it was dismissed by the Director as untimely, as failing to set 
forth any facts upon which a finding of improper motivation by the District could be 
based and as beyond PERB's jurisdiction for those allegations concerning the 
arbitrator's conduct at her disciplinary arbitration hearing. 
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Toshunbe argues in her exceptions that the Director erred factually and legally in 
his decision. The District supports the Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
Toshunbe,-a4ypistemployed-by4he-Districtr alleges ia-herxharge-that she-was -•-
served with disciplinary charges by the District on February 10, 1998. The District 
sought her termination and alleged 21 counts of incompetence, 12 counts of 
insubordination, and 11 counts of misconduct. Toshunbe was represented by an 
attorney at the arbitration hearing on the disciplinary charges held on June 29 and 30, 
1998. Toshunbe further alleges that the arbitrator, in his October 16,1998 decision, 
dismissed the charges, despite there being no evidence that the District had ever 
issued any warnings or disciplinary notices to Toshunbe. Apparently, though, based on 
the disciplinary charges before him, the arbitrator found that Toshunbe was "stubborn, 
abstinent (sic) and lack (sic) respect for authority," and he ordered a two-week 
suspension without pay for Toshunbe, noting that the District could consider it a 
progressive disciplinary action. 
The disciplinary charges were brought in February 1998, more than four months 
before the improper practice charge was filed. These allegations are clearly untimely.1 
Those allegations in the charge relating to the conduct of the arbitration hearing are 
1Section 204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure requires improper practice 
charges to be filed within four months of the acts alleged to violate the Act. 
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also untimely as the hearing was held on June 29 and 30, 1998, and the charge was 
not filed until December 11,1998. 
The allegations related to the arbitration award itself, received by Toshunbe on 
October 16, 1998, are timely. However, as the Director determined, review of an 
: arbitrator's awardJs notavailable in_anJmproper practicaproceeding against an 
employer. Review of that award is available under Civil Practice Law and Rules 
(CPLR) Article 75. "To avoid our becoming a substitute for or an alternative to the 
statutory review procedures, a CPLR proceeding should be the preferred mechanism 
for the review, modification or vacatur of disciplinary arbitration awards, absent 
i extraordinary circumstances."2 
\ Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
Director is affirmed. 
| IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: March 23, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
2See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist, 26 PERB H3053, at 3092 (1993). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BREWSTER PHILLIPS, 
Gharging-Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20535 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
HAUPPAUGE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
BREWSTER PHILLIPS, pro se 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, ESQ. (ERIC J. LaRUFFA of counsel), for 
Respondent 
LAMB & BARNOSKY, LLP (ROBERT H. COHEN of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Brewster Phillips to a decision of 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
his charge that the United Public Service Employees Union (Union) violated §209-a.1(c) 
and (d) and §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in its 
handling of a grievance on his behalf. Phillips' employer, the Hauppauge Union Free 
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School District (District), was not a named respondent in the original improper practice 
charge. The District is, nevertheless, a statutory party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
Phillips' charge consists of a brief statement under the "Details of Charge" 
section of the improper practice charge form in which Phillips alleges that another 
i 
J employee, with less seniority than-he,-had_been_appointedJ:o a position soughtby_ 
Phillips. Phillips further alleges that he was represented at a Step 2 grievance 
proceeding by the Union and that certain documents that were to have been produced 
by the District at the proceeding were not provided. The charge is continued in a 
voluminous packet of over one hundred pages of attachments to the charge, consisting 
of letters by Phillips, the Union or District representatives, memoranda relating to 
) Phillips' employment and other miscellaneous documents. 
Phillips was notified that the charge was deficient in that the District was not 
named as a respondent, that an individual lacked standing to allege a violation of 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act, no facts were pled which would support a finding of a violation of 
§209-a.1(c) of the Act and that the charge, while having numerous attachments, did not 
specify what conduct by the Union was alleged to violate §209-a.2(c) of the Act. 
Phillips filed an amendment to the charge. The Director, finding that the charge 
remained deficient, dismissed it. 
In his exceptions, Phillips alleges that the Director erred, arguing that his 
amendment corrected the noted deficiencies with the charge. Both the District and the 
Union support the Director's decision. 
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Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, the decision of the Director is affirmed. 
Phillips is employed by the District as a custodian, on the second, or night, shift. 
The allegations in the charge stem from Phillips' desire to be appointed to a position on 
theday shift to which-another,-less-senior,-employee-had^been-appointed.-With the 
Union's assistance, Phillips grieved the appointment. At the second step hearing on 
the grievance, at which Phillips was represented by the Union, the District 
representative stated that it had the option to appoint the candidate who, in its opinion, 
was best for the position. Shortly thereafter, the Union advised Phillips that it was not 
going to pursue the grievance to the third and final step of the grievance procedure, 
) nonbinding arbitration. Phillips alleges that the Union's stated position was that it had 
previously lost a similar grievance and that it felt further pursuit of the grievance might 
jeopardize Phillips' chances for a promotion or another position in the future. 
Phillips argues throughout the documents attached to his charge that he is 
qualified for the position, that he disagrees with the District's definition of "opinion" and 
that his grievance was meritorious and should have been pursued by the Union.1 
1Phillips also alleges that the amount of time that elapsed between the second 
step hearing and the date the Union notified him that it was not pursuing the grievance 
~ twelve days - is itself violative of the Act. A lapse of seven working days is not the 
type of delay that we have previously found to be violative of the duty of fair 
representation. See Nassau Educ. Chapter of the Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist. Unit, Civil 
Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc. (Marinoff), 11 PERB 1J3010, at 3020 (1978), where the 
union's 13-month delay in responding to a grievance was found to be "grossly 
irresponsible conduct." 
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Phillips' charge against the District, assuming there is any given that the District 
was not named as a respondent, was properly dismissed by the Director. An individual 
employee has no standing to allege a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act.2 
As to the alleged violation of §209-a.1(c), Phillips alleges no activities or actions on his 
-.- —part-which-involve-theexercise-of'protected rights._Also,there are_no facts-pled- which 
would support a finding that the District's failure to appoint Phillips to the day shift 
vacancy was improperly motivated. As the elements necessary to sustain, the finding of 
a violation of §209-a.1(c) of the Act are absent from Phillips' pleadings, the charge 
against the District was properly dismissed.3 
As against the Union, we have continuously held that an employee organization 
\ does not have the duty to take every grievance presented to it or to process every 
grievance through the grievance procedure as long as its decision is promptly 
communicated to the employee and is not arbitrary, discriminatory or made in bad 
faith.4 Here, the Union took Phillips' grievance through two steps of the grievance 
2
 See, e.g., City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York and United Fed'n of Teachers, 
27 PERB 1J3072 (1994); Local 100, Transport Workers Union of America, 27 PERB 
1J3008 (1994); City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 22 PERB P 0 1 2 (1989). 
3See, e.g., Green Chimneys Children's Servs., 31 PERB 1J3014 (1998); New 
Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist. and New Paltz United Teachers, 31 PERB 1J3013 (1998); State of 
New York (OMH), 24 PERB 1J3032 (1991); County of Cattaraugus and Sheriff of 
Cattaraugus County, 24 PERB 113001 (1991); County of Erie Bd. of Elections, 19 PERB 
113069 (1986); City of Salamanca, 18 PERB 1J3012 (1985). 
4Nassau Educational Chapter of the Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist. Unit, Civil Serv. 
Employees Ass'n, Inc., supra note 1; Faculty Ass'n of Hudson Valley Community 
College, 15 PERB 1J3080 (1982). 
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procedure, made a reasoned decision not to pursue the grievance any further and 
communicated its decision to Phillips in a timely fashion. While Phillips disagrees with 
the Union's assessment of the potential merit of his grievance, he has pled no facts 
which would establish that the Union violated its duty of fair representation in the 
handlin.g-and-d.isp.osi.tion-.of-his_grieYan.ee. _._ 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: March 23, 1999 
Albany, New York 
) 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/
 "Marc A. Abbott, Member 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREENBURGH NO. 11 FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20047 
GREENBURGH NO. 11 UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JEFFREY R. CASSIDY, for Charging Party 
SHAW & PERELSON, LLP (DAVID S. SHAW and SUSAN G. WHITELEY of 
counsel), for Respondent 
MURRY F. SOLOMON, for NEW YORK STATE ASSOCIATION OF 
MANAGEMENT ADVOCATES FOR SCHOOL LABOR AFFAIRS, AMICUS 
CURIAE 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Greenburgh No. 11 Federation 
of Teachers (Federation) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a 
charge filed against the Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School District (District). The 
Federation alleges that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it submitted to fact-finding a demand to delete the class 
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size provision1 in these parties' long expired agreement2 from any successor collective 
bargaining agreement they may reach. 
On a stipulated record, the ALJ dismissed the charge, holding that the 
conversion theory of negotiability under our decision in City ofCohoes3 (hereafter 
Co/?oes) is appropriately extended4o-negotiationsJnvolvingschooLdistricts.-ln-Co/joes, 
we held that all legal terms in a collective bargaining agreement between a union 
representing police officers or fire fighters and their employer4 are mandatorily 
negotiable "terms and conditions of employment" within the meaning of the Act5 by 
virtue of the incorporation of those terms into the parties' agreement, regardless of the 
subject nature of those contract terms. 
;
 ) 
1The District is a "special act" school district serving emotionally disturbed 
students. The contract term restricts classes to no more than eleven students unless 
the parties agree otherwise. 
2The parties' last agreement expired on June 30, 1993, and there is still an 
impasse over a salary allocation for the 1992-93 school year. 
331 PERB 1J3020, appeal dismissed as premature, 31 PERB 1J7017 (Sup. Ct. 
Albany County 1998) (appeal pending). We applied the Cohoes conversion theory of 
negotiability in City of Utica, 31 PERB 1J3075 (1998). Our decision in City of Utica was 
recently confirmed. Utica Professional Firefighters Ass'n, Local 32 v. Cuevas, 32 PERB 
1J7005 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1999). In confirming, the Court approved our 
application of Cohoes as a "legitimate exercise by the Board in defining the scope of 
mandatory negotiations." 
4We left open in Cohoes the question whether the supplemental theory of 
negotiability should be extended to negotiations involving any other types of employers 
and employees. 
5Act §201.4. 
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Although noting that class size by its subject nature is not a mandatory subject of 
negotiation,6 the ALJ held that class size became a mandatorily negotiable subject for 
these parties under Cohoes. Therefore, the District's insistence at fact-finding upon its 
demand to delete the existing contractual class size provision was not a refusal to 
negotiate, < 
The Federation argues in its exceptions that Cohoes should not be extended to 
negotiations involving school district personnel. In response, the District argues that we 
should adopt a substantially restricted version of Cohoes for negotiations involving 
school districts, one it has labeled a "removal conversion" theory of negotiability, the 
details of which are discussed infra. As this removal conversion argument was first 
made in the District's response to the Federation's exceptions, the Federation filed a 
reply with our permission.7 The Federation urges us to reject the District's removal 
conversion theory of negotiability in favor of a straightforward extension of Cohoes if we 
reject its basic argument that Cohoes should not be extended to school district 
negotiations at all. An amicus curiae brief has been filed by the New York State 
Management Advocates for School Labor Affairs. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' and amicus arguments, 
we affirm the ALJ's decision. In affirming, we reject as unpersuasive the arguments 
6E.g., West Irondequoit Bd. ofEduc, 4 PERB1J3070 (1971), aff'd sub nom. West 
Irondequoit Teachers'Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 7 PERB 1J7014 (1974). 
7Rules of Procedure §204.11. 
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opposing an extension of Cohoes to negotiations involving school district personnel and 
the District's arguments urging adoption of a removal conversion theory of negotiability. 
The Federation advances the following as its basic reasons for not extending 
Cohoes to negotiations involving school districts: 
_!._:The impasse-proceduresTorschooLdistrictsare materially-different-from 
those for public safety personnel and expanding the scope of negotiations in school 
districts will make it more difficult for the parties to reach agreement because those 
school district impasse procedures lack finality; 
2. An extension of Cohoes to school districts will cause litigation to clarify the 
inherent ambiguity in the Cohoes conversion theory of negotiability; 
} 3. Changes in negotiability analysis should be done legislatively. 
We address each of these arguments in the order listed. 
The parties to negotiations involving school district personnel and those to 
negotiations involving police and fire officers have identical collective bargaining rights 
and obligations in all relevant respects except as to the statutory system which 
becomes applicable if they reach an impasse in their negotiations. Although all public 
employers and public employees have mediation available to them,8 impasses involving 
police and fire personnel are subject to resolution by compulsory binding interest 
arbitration.9 School district negotiations are not subject to resolution by compulsory 
8Act §209.3(a). 
9Act §§209.2 & 209.4. 
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interest arbitration. If post-mediation fact-finding10 does not result in a settlement of the 
impasse, the parties themselves must resolve the impasse by reaching a new collective 
bargaining agreement.11 PERB may continue to render third-party assistance to help 
the parties reach an agreement,12 but an impasse in school district negotiations 
—- — - continuesforhowever-long it takes-the-partiesto reactta-collective bargaining -
agreement. 
We do not agree with the Federation's argument that this difference in impasse 
procedures is persuasive reason not to apply Cohoes to school district negotiations. 
There are at least as many of the same reasons to apply a Cohoes supplemental 
theory of negotiability to school district negotiations as there are in police or fire 
\ negotiations. Indeed, there is arguably more reason to apply Cohoes in negotiations 
involving school district personnel precisely because the parties' themselves must 
effect the finality to negotiations in school districts. 
Although we detail the analysis hereafter, our core rationale is simple. As the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement define the employment-related rights and 
obligations of the parties to that contract, those contract provisions are terms and 
conditions of employment. Those terms are naturally the ones most likely to be the 
focus of the parties' efforts to reach a successor collective bargaining agreement. The 
10Act §209.3(b)-(d). 
11Act §209.3(f). 
12/d. 
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harmonious and cooperative labor relations which the Legislature sees as a means to 
ensure that there is no disruption of public services13 is best achieved by requiring the 
parties to a contract to negotiate about the deletion, modification or continuation of any 
legal term they have already agreed to and incorporated into their contract. That 
-proposition beingas true for negotiations involving school district-personnel asi t isfor-
negotiations involving public safety personnel, Cohoes is properly applied to both 
groups of employers and employees. To extend Cohoes to negotiations involving 
school district personnel will better the bargaining and impasse processes. 
Alternatively, to not extend Cohoes would produce results inconsistent with the policies 
of the Act because it would deny the parties a legal means to compel a discussion 
about all of the currently prevailing employment terms, a circumstance destined to lead 
to protracted impasses and a possible interruption in the operations and functions of 
government. 
In beginning our discussion of the first of the Federation's grounds in opposition 
to an extension of Cohoes to negotiations involving school district personnel, it bears 
emphasis that the impasse procedures applicable in school districts do not lack 
"finality". It is true that finality to negotiations in school districts is obtained only by the 
parties themselves by their reaching a collective bargaining agreement and not, as with 
police or fire negotiations, by an award issued by a third-party panel. Finality exists in 
either circumstance, oniy the agents of that finaiity and the means by which that finaiity 
13Act §200. 
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is achieved differ. But just as an arbitration panel needs the parties' positions with 
respect to the full range of any disputes between them which involve the terms of their 
existing collective bargaining agreement, so, too, do the parties themselves, who are 
the agents of finality for purposes of school district negotiations. These parties should 
—have the legal right to-insist-upon-the negotiation-of-all-of-the terms of^heir-collective 
bargaining agreements, whether or not those terms are mandatorily negotiable under 
traditional scope of bargaining analysis. To deny parties the legal right to insist upon 
demands for the deletion, modification or continuation of all the terms of their current 
agreement only increases the likelihood of their resort to destabilizing and disruptive 
self-help measures, whether unilateral action by employers or strikes by public 
employees. 
Moreover, should the parties to school district negotiations reach an impasse in 
their negotiations, the fact finder, just like an interest arbitration panel, should be 
permitted to hear the parties' positions on all of the issues involving the terms of their 
existing collective bargaining agreement and to render recommendations on all of those 
issues as appropriate. Were we to not extend Cohoes to school district negotiations, 
the statutory impasse processes would be prevented from working to maximum 
advantage, thereby inviting impasses of prolonged duration over items in an agreement 
forced off the table upon objection by one of the parties to the bargaining relationship. 
Both the Federation and the District are mistaken in their assertion that Cohoes 
rests only on the availability of interest arbitration for public safety personnel. Those 
just happened to be the type of employees who were involved with Cohoes and the two 
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prior cases where a request for the adoption of a supplemental theory of negotiability 
was made.14 What drives Cohoes fundamentally is the unfairness, both to the parties 
and the statutory system of collective bargaining itself, of maintaining a strict subject 
matter negotiability analysis when §209-a.1 (e) of the Act continues as a matter of law 
„._,_ all -terms-of an agreementupon^expiration otthat agreement, regardless of•-the-subject— 
matter addressed by those contract terms. The same bargaining dilemma we 
discussed in Cohoes, which previously faced the parties to police/fire negotiations, 
faces school district negotiators now. If Cohoes is not extended to school district 
negotiations, the parties to those negotiations would be presented with the full range of 
the same problems which finally persuaded us in Cohoes to expand the scope of 
mandatory negotiation to include all legal terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 
The Federation also argues that the nonbinding nature of a fact-finding report 
makes an extension of Cohoes to school districts inadvisable. The operative theory of 
fact-finding, however, is that a recommendation by a fact finder on a given issue or set 
of issues may assist the parties in reaching an agreement. We do not have to know 
that a fact finder's recommendation will be accepted to find purpose in the 
recommendation itself. Were we to not extend Cohoes to school district negotiations, 
we would deprive the parties of the value of a neutral's perspective on the issues in the 
parties' current agreement which may be keeping them from reaching a successor 
agreement. By permitting that recommendation to be given, whether or not it is 
uCity of Glens Falls, 30 PERB 1J3047 (1997); Johnstown Police Benevolent 
Ass'n, 25 PERB 1J3085 (1992). 
^ Board - U-20047 -9 
ultimately accepted by the parties, the reasons which persuaded the Legislature to 
impose a fact-finding requirement in the first place are clearly given effect. 
The Federation next argues that because Cohoes makes more subjects 
mandatorily negotiable, closure by agreement will become more difficult for the parties. 
^-,-..-^We-do-not,-however-,-share-the-Federation^s-V-iew-that-the-parties-.-right-to-negotiate — — - — -
about all legal terms in their agreement is undesirable or will have the negative effect 
the Federation predicts. We have long encouraged parties to negotiate all matters in 
dispute in recognition that this advances the policies of the Act. To the extent the 
parties to school district negotiations have accepted our encouragement, an extension 
of Cohoes to school districts merely makes dejure what is already de facto. To the 
) extent those parties have resisted our encouragement, we now find compelling reasons 
to grant them the legal right, and to expose them to the legal duty, to bargain subjects 
in their contracts which they cannot bargain now over objection under traditional 
negotiability analysis. We simply do not agree with the Federation that an extension of 
Cohoes will make it any more difficult than it already is for the parties to reach an 
agreement in school district negotiations. Rather, we believe that the body of our law 
which prevents the parties from negotiating, as of right, all of the terms of their existing 
agreement, the very terms which may be keeping them from reaching a successor 
agreement, makes no sense as a matter of logic or policy. Forced nonbargaining does 
not make the contract issues in dispute disappear, nor does it render them any less 
important to the parties in the course of their deliberations for a new contract. 
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We also do not agree with the Federation's assertion that Cohoes is ambiguous. 
Although we recognized that there may be refinements needed to the Cohoes 
conversion theory of negotiability, Cohoes' basic construct, covering the vast majority of 
bargaining situations, is without any ambiguity at all. If the term of an agreement is 
legal, it isa term andconditionotemployment which either-party-may-negotiate-and 
insist upon at and after fact-finding. Cohoes makes scope of bargaining analysis far 
easier and it creates far more predictable negotiability outcomes than does traditional 
subject matter negotiability analysis. Any litigation needed to refine Cohoes will be 
much less than that we have had for many years, and continue to have to date, 
involving disputes as to whether a given demand is or is not mandatorily negotiable 
under subject matter analysis. 
The Federation also claims that Cohoes should not be extended to school district 
negotiations because there is no reason to believe that traditionally nonmandatory 
subjects, such as class size, which have not been settled before fact-finding, will be 
settled after fact-finding. We consider the Federation's argument in this regard to be 
entirely speculative, contrary to the common-sense and labor relations truism that the 
passage of time itself brings increased pressure upon the parties to settle, and one in 
conflict with the policies of the Act underlying the fact-finding and conciliation impasse 
resolution processes. 
The Federation's contention that any change in traditional negotiability analysis 
should be done legislatively was addressed by us and rejected in Cohoes. Although a 
legislative resolution of the bargaining dilemma we discussed in Cohoes may have 
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been preferable to some, the absence of legislation to deal with this observed dilemma 
existing since 1982 does not deny us the right nor exempt us from the duty to 
determine what are "terms and conditions of employment" for purposes of the Act. The 
Legislature intentionally eschewed specificity in defining the quoted phrase in favor of 
vesting the power to make negotiability-determinations-withRERBso4hatwe could 
make adjustments in negotiability analysis as timeand circumstances made necessary 
and appropriate.15 "Inherent in this delegation is the power to interpret and construe 
the statutory scheme."16 
Such opposition as there is by the District and the amicus to an extension of an 
unmodified Cohoes theory of negotiability to school district negotiations is as 
\ unpersuasive as the Federation's opposition. 
The District argues that Cohoes conflicts with decisions by the Court of Appeals 
holding that employers do not have a statutory duty to negotiate "nonmandatory" 
subjects. Cohoes, however, is entirely consistent with those decisions. Cohoes makes 
the legal terms of an agreement "terms and conditions of employment" within the 
meaning of the Act as a matter of law. It is those "terms and conditions of employment" 
to which the parties' statutory bargaining rights and obligations attach.17 Phrased 
15See Joint Legislative Committee on the Taylor Law, 1971-72 Report, State of 
New York Legislative Document No, 25 (1972) at 33-4, 
16Wesf Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 51, 7 PERB |[7014, 
at 7029 (1974). 
17Act §§204.2 & 204.3. 
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differently, that which is "nonmandatory" under one theory of negotiability has become 
mandatory under another, supplemental theory. All Cohoes requires is that unions and 
employers bargain on demand "terms and conditions of employment," a result precisely 
in keeping with the Act and the decisions relied upon by the District. 
There is also an -argument-raised -by~the amicus-thatan- extension- of Cohoes will _-
deprive school districts of their "right" not to carry over a nonmandatory subject of . 
negotiation into a new agreement. Extending Cohoes to school districts, however, does 
not prevent a school district from taking a position that any term of an agreement will 
not be continued in a new agreement. The carry over into a successor contract of any 
term in the parties' current contract was by agreement before Cohoes and it will still be 
by agreement after Cohoes is extended to school district negotiations. That position 
declaration, however, if raised at or after fact-finding, subjects a school district to a 
refusal to bargain charge under current law because the statement is arguably a 
proposal by the employer to delete that term from the next agreement or a statement 
conditioning the next collective bargaining agreement upon the union's agreement to 
discontinue that term. Only by extending Cohoes to school district negotiations can a 
school district, or a union making the same declaration, be ensured of the legal right to 
state and insist that the next contract will not contain the objectionable clause. The 
example actually used by the amicus participant will illustrate the inaccuracy of its belief 
that Cohoes extended to school districts will be detrimental to a school district's 
interests. 
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A school district has agreed to a no layoff, no position abolition clause in an 
agreement. Subject to a public policy argument, unlikely to find judicial acceptance,18 
§209-a.1(e) of the Act will require the continuation of that clause after the contract 
expires until a new agreement is negotiated. The clause would not become 
unenforceable upon a declaration thatitwillnotbexontinued in the next contract 
Moreover, a successful scope of negotiation charge by an employer against a union 
only prevents the union from negotiating the subject at or after fact-finding. Such 
charge does not result in the union's agreement to eliminate the clause nor does it 
permit the employer to discontinue that clause upon expiration of the agreement 
containing the clause. Although the clause must be continued until a new agreement is 
reached, existing law does not afford either party, over the objection of the other, any 
right to negotiate demands regarding the elimination, continuation or modification of 
that clause at or after fact-finding. If the amicus' objection is simply to the imposition of 
a bargaining obligation to subjects in a contract previously exempt from such obligation 
under traditional negotiability analysis, we find no persuasive reason to deny the parties 
to school district negotiations the legal right to negotiate about any legal term of their 
agreement. The result of a contrary decision, which would force discussion of a 
contract term off the table upon objection once fact-finding is reached, is potentially 
18The courts have upheld the obligations imposed upon employers under 
§209-a.1(e) of the Act as against all public policy arguments raised to date. City of 
Utica v. Zumpano, 91 N.Y.2d 964, 31 PERB117501 (1998); Maplewood-Colonie 
Common Sch. Dist. v. Maplewood Teachers Ass'n, 57 N.Y.2d 1025, 15 PERB 1J7538 
(1982). 
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years of intractable impasse. By extending Cohoes to school district negotiations we at 
least afford the parties a forum for the negotiation as of right about the subjects most 
likely to be the source of the division between them, an end fully in keeping with the 
policies of the Act. 
Just as we find no merit in the opposition to an extension of Cocoes to 
negotiations involving school district personnel, we find no merit in the District's 
argument for adoption of a "removal conversion" theory of negotiability. Under the 
District's theory, only demands to delete existing contract terms which are 
nonmandatory under traditional negotiability analysis would be converted into 
mandatorily negotiable terms and conditions of employment. Demands to delete could 
j be met only by agreement, silence or a counterproposal itself mandatorily negotiable by 
its inherent subject nature. Counterproposals to continue the existing terms and ones 
to modify the existing term would be unlawful upon objection. Similarly, a fact finder 
would not be permitted to recommend anything other than deletion as proposed or a 
recommendation itself mandatorily negotiable under traditional subject matter 
negotiability analysis. 
We reject this theory because it conflicts with every principle underlying Cohoes. 
The District's argument effects the very one-way street of negotiability we 
rejected in Cohoes as flatly contrary to the policies of the Act. Although "removal 
conversion" could, in theory, be invoked by both unions and employers, demands to 
delete would come overwhelmingly from employers seeking release from existing 
;
 contractual restrictions upon what are by nature their managerial prerogatives. It is 
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difficult for us to even envision demands by unions to delete traditionally nonmandatory 
subjects from agreements because whatever restrictions upon managerial prerogatives 
there may be in an agreement will most likely be ones to the union's and the unit 
employees' advantage. Unions would most likely be seeking to at least continue if not 
expand upon the terms ofthe agreement which employers would beproposingfor-
deletion. Thus, the reality of our adopting a removal conversion theory of negotiability 
would be a radical distortion of the balanced rights and obligations fashioned by the 
Legislature for bargaining relationships existing under the Act, a balance Cohoes 
underscores and strives to maintain. But even if the reality of opportunity to bargain 
matched the theory, we would reject the District's removal conversion theory of 
j negotiability because it creates a wholly artificial restraint on the bargaining and 
impasse processes. 
As Cohoes stresses, we cannot create a negotiability system that allows a party 
to negotiate exemptions from existing contractual obligations, but disallows the other 
party from making proposals and arguments in opposition to that demand. We have 
never placed limits on the merits of proposals involving subjects mandatorily negotiable 
under traditional subject matter negotiability analysis. There is simply no reason to 
place those merits limits on subjects which are no less "terms and conditions of 
employment", albeit under a different theory of negotiability. Bargaining under the Act 
as to all terms and conditions of employment is and must be mutual and reciprocal 
along a continuous two-way street. Bargaining under a removal conversion theory of 
negotiability is neither. It is, instead, a one-way street to a dead end. 
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! The District's removal conversion theory is also fairly rejected because it denies 
the parties themselves and third-party neutrals any legal ability to address the full 
scope of the problems stemming from current contractual provisions which may be 
actually dividing the parties. Consider the class size demand in issue. If the District's 
restricted theory of negotiability-were adopted, its demand-to delete-thisclasssize 
provision will be met only by silence from the Federation because it does not agree to 
its removal from the next contract and it could not make a counterproposal to that 
demand, even one just to continue the existing contract term. Without an agreement to 
delete the class size provision, the District would not, however, be privileged to 
discontinue that term of the expired agreement until a new collective bargaining 
•) agreement were reached, unless the Federation were to earlier strike in violation of the 
Act. 
By preventing the Federation from responding to the merits of the District's 
demand to delete the class size provision, "removal conversion" only ensures that the 
dispute between these parties over class size will remain undiscussed and unresolved. 
Without full bargaining over the merits of class size, the subject will likely be ignored on 
and after fact-finding. If the subject were not ignored, such discussions as were 
attempted about class size over objection would be off the record or conducted in other 
ways designed to avoid the Federation being charged with insisting upon the 
negotiation of a nonmandatory subject. None of these alternative outcomes positions 
the parties to reach an agreement. Parties should be entitled to and required to 
' negotiate about the terms in their agreement that may be dividing them, not given 
incentives to manufacture mandatorily negotiable demands they have no real interest in 
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securing just to disguise their true desire to negotiate the traditionally nonmandatory 
subjects in their agreement or reasons to resort to sub rosa discussions. An extension 
of Cohoes to school district negotiations will focus the parties' efforts above board on 
what in their current agreement is actually keeping them from reaching a successor 
agreement. The result may not be a quicker-orbetter-agreement, but it is surely^a 
means to that end, one not available under traditional subject matter negotiability 
analysis. 
"Removal conversion" also does not sit at all well within the context of the 
statutory impasse procedures for school districts. As the District itself recognizes, a 
fact finder's purpose is to recommend a basis for the parties to settle their dispute. By 
denying a fact finder the full picture with respect to the parties' dispute over existing 
contract terms, removal conversion prevents a fact finder from "finishing the job", a 
result the District itself realizes must be avoided. 
There is one last reason to reject the District's removal conversion theory of 
negotiability but one no less persuasive than the several others we have already 
discussed. The Act contemplates a uniformity of bargaining rights and obligations. A 
removal conversion theory of negotiability would create a special set of bargaining rules 
for school district negotiations only, for no persuasive reason, a result again contrary to 
the terms and policies of the Act. 
Having determined there to be compelling reasons for an extension of Cohoes to 
school district negotiations, and none favoring its nonextension, or the District's removal 
conversion theory of negotiability, we hold that the District's demand is one embracing 
a term and condition of employment within the meaning of the Act. The District's 
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submission of the class size demand for consideration by the fact finder was, therefore, 
not an improper refusal to negotiate. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Federation's exceptions are denied and the 
ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IX-IS,-THEREFORE,-ORDERED-that the charge must be, and itherebyis, 
dismissed. 
DATED: March 23, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
' Marc A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Patricia Beattie to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing her charge that the Guiiderland Teachers 
Aide Association, NEA (Association) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) in the processing and handling of a sexual harassment complaint 
against Roger Levinthal, a teacher and acting principal employed by the Guiiderland 
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Central School District (District). The District is made a statutory party to this 
proceeding pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
The ALJ held several days of hearing, during which Beattie, who was 
represented by counsel, presented her direct case. At the close of Beattie's case, the 
Association-and the District-moved to dismiss the charge.-^The record was closedat 
that point. After the receipt of briefs, the ALJ granted the motion in a very detailed 
decision. 
Beattie has filed several exceptions to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ 
made both factual and legal errors. The Association supports the ALJ's decision. The 
District has not responded to the exceptions.1 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
A multi-page charge, amendments and clarification of the pleadings by the 
conferencing ALJ preceded seven days of hearing during which numerous exhibits, 
including the depositions taken by the District's representative during its investigation of 
the complaints of sexual harassment, were introduced into the record. Beattie testified 
and called Harold Beyer, an Association attorney, Rex Trobridge, an Association 
1As noted by the ALJ, the District raised timeliness as an affirmative defense in 
its answer. While the ALJ addressed events occurring more than four months prior to 
the filing of the charge as background to the charge, any allegations relating to those 
events were ruled by the ALJ at the hearing to be untimely and those rulings were 
confirmed in his decision. No exceptions have been taken to those rulings. 
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representative, and Barbara Coogan, the Association president, to testify as part of her 
direct case. 
The ALJ's decision details the processing of the improper practice charge and 
sets forth in detail Beattie's allegations and the defenses of the Association and the 
—= District. The ALJ granted the Association's-andthe-Districts-motions-to-dismiss.-He 
found that the evidence in the record, even given a reading most favorable to Beattie, 
was insufficient to support a finding that the Association breached its duty of fair 
representation. In reaching his decision, the ALJ credited the testimony of Beyer, 
Trobridge and Coogan where it differed from Beattie's testimony. 
The charge, filed on June 5, 1997, may be distilled into two allegations against 
'} the Association: that Beyer refused to file or process a complaint of sexual harassment 
against Levinthal when requested to do so by Beattie in a letter received by Beyer on 
February 5, 1997, and that Coogan told Beattie, later in February 1997, that she would 
lose her job because she had retained private counsel to represent her in the sexual 
harassment complaint.2 
In June 1996, after Coogan commented to Beattie that she seemed troubled, 
Beattie told Coogan that she was upset about Levinthal. Coogan advised her to call 
Trobridge. After Beattie and Trobridge spoke, Trobridge, having determined that 
Beattie might have a complaint of sexual harassment, set up a meeting with William 
2ln both pre-hearing correspondence and in opening statements at the hearing, 
Beattie's counsel reiterated that the charge was about these two allegations. 
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Adams, the District's Director of Human Resources. At the meeting a few days later,3 
Trobridge learned for the first time that Levinthal had complained in January 1996 to 
Marcil that Beattie was sexually harassing him. Hearing that Beattie also had a 
complaint, Adams turned the investigation of the entire matter over to a private 
attorney.^Thomas Kenney,-who-interviewed-many-employees,Jncluding those named -
by Beattie as witnesses to the alleged acts of harassment by Levinthal.4 Prior to the 
interview, Beattie met with Trobridge and Beyer. She was advised that the Association 
would represent her in any proceedings pursuant to the District's sexual harassment 
policy and/or any proceedings before the New York State Division of Human Rights. 
Beattie reiterated that she just wanted Levinthal to leave her alone. Beyer then sent a 
> letter to the District's attorney, David Garvey, informing him that the Association was 
representing Beattie in both her complaint against Levinthal and in Levinthal's 
complaint against Beattie. 
In early September 1996, Beyer conveyed to Beattie an offer from Adams that 
Beattie could be reassigned to another building. Beattie declined, noting that she was 
not having any more problems with Levinthal. In October 1996, Beyer forwarded to 
Beattie copies of the transcripts of her interviews. Beyer received the remainder of the 
3At the meeting with Trobridge and Adams, were Beattie, her adult son, and 
Deborah Marcil, principal of Farnsworth Middle School, where Beattie and Levinthal are 
employed. 
4Beattie was twice interviewed by Kenney, once in September 1996 and again 
in October 1996. Beyer was present with Beattie at both of her interviews, as was her 
husband. 
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interview transcripts in November or December 1996. Without exception, each 
interviewee with knowledge of the events covered by the complaints corroborated 
Levinthal's claims and offered no support for Beattie's claims. Beyer did not send 
Beattie copies of those transcripts.5 
I nearlyFebruary J.997, Beyerreceived a-letter_from„Beattie,_dated-Eebruary_2, 
1996, stating: 
Enclosed you will find a letter I have written to Mr. Adams 
regarding Mr. Levinthal's recent behavior towards me. If you 
think that it is complete, please forward the letter to 
Mr. Adams. 
Attached to the letter was a handwritten letter from Beattie to Adams, detailing several 
incidents when Levinthal allegedly was staring at Beattie, following her around the 
cafeteria and standing close to her or staring at her in the Principal's office as she 
distributed the mail. Beattie noted in the letter that this behavior made her 
uncomfortable and that she wanted her letter treated as a formal complaint against 
Levinthal. 
Through Trobridge, Beyer requested that Beattie call him to discuss the letters. 
Beyer testified that he was confused because of the dates on the letters and because 
the allegations were similar to ones made by Beattie in 1996. Further, Beattie had told 
Beyer in the fall of 1996 that Levinthal was no longer bothering her and finally, the 
5Beyer had been informed by Trobridge that Coogan believed that Beattie was a 
victim of spousal abuse. Given that assertion, Beyer and Trobridge decided to be 
"careful" in their handling of the case. As the deposed witnesses supported Levinthal's 
complaint that Beattie had pursued him, Beyer decided not to mail the transcripts of the 
depositions to Beattie's home where they might be read by Beattie's husband. 
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District was at that time still conducting its investigation of the complaints of sexual 
harassment made in January and June 1996 by Levinthal and Beattie, respectively. 
Beyer and Beattie spoke the next day and Beyer suggested to Beattie that she 
wait until she had attended, accompanied by Trobridge, a meeting set for February 24, 
—.- 1997, with-theDistrictwhere-the sexual harassmenLcomplaints mightbe_resolved.._He 
advised her to rewrite her letter of complaint to set forth only the facts and not her 
feelings, and told her that if she was not satisfied with the results of the February 24 
meeting, he would file a formal complaint for her.6 
The February 24 meeting was rescheduled to March 18, 1997, after the District 
received notification that Beattie had retained private counsel on February 2 1 , 1997. At 
~\ the March 18 meeting, the District advised Beattie that her complaint against Levinthal 
had not been substantiated by any witnesses called by Kenney in his investigation but 
that those witnesses had corroborated Levinthal's complaint. Beattie was, therefore, 
formally reprimanded by the Superintendent. 
In late February 1997, Beattie was approached by Coogan, who told her that she 
thought that Beattie was crazy to retain private counsel when she had a union lawyer to 
represent her and that she would probably lose her house. 
6Beyer testified that he intended to pursue her complaint with the Division of 
Human Rights, as the District's procedure would be concluded with the February 24 
meeting. He did not understand Beattie's letter to be a request that he file a grievance 
because a grievance had never been discussed. Beyer thought that Beattie wanted the 
matter pursued through the District's sexual harassment procedure and, if not resolved, 
then as a complaint to the Division of Human Rights. 
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Initially, we find, as did the ALJ, that the only timely allegations in the charge 
concern Beyer's failure to process Beattie's February 2 letter and Coogan's remarks to 
Beattie in late February 1997. Section 204.1(a) of our Rules of Procedure provides that 
an improper practice charge must be filed within four months of the acts alleged to be 
improper.~Here,-Beattie's charge-was-filed-on June 5,J 997. Therefore, only the 
allegations relating to events occurring on or after February 5, 1997 are timely. 
Beattie argues in her exceptions that the ALJ failed to apply the proper motion to 
dismiss standards. We held in County of Nassau (Police Department),7 that a charging 
party will be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the record in 
considering a motion to dismiss. Utilizing that standard, the ALJ reviewed the totality of 
") the evidence introduced by Beattie, including her testimony and the testimony of the 
three witnesses called as part of her direct case: Beyer, Trobridge and Coogan. The 
ALJ credited the testimony of Beyer, Trobridge and Coogan, where there were 
differences, over the testimony of Beattie. His decision to do so was based upon their 
testimony and their demeanor as witnesses. There was a direct conflict between 
Beattie's testimony and the testimony offered by her other witnesses. As we stated in 
City ofLockport and AFSCME, Council 66 (Herberger),8 in circumstances in which there 
is 
a direct conflict in the charging party's evidence ... the 
making of a credibility determination necessary to decide the 
motion at the ciose of the charging party's case [is] 
appropriate. 
717PERB 1J3013 (1984). 
822 PERB P059, at 3135 (1989). 
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The credibility resolution made by the ALJ against Beattie and in favor of the 
other witnesses should be affirmed. Our determination in this regard is in keeping with 
the weight appropriately accorded to such credibility determinations by the trier of fact 
who had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the demeanor of all the witnesses.9 
Beattie also arguesJhattheALJ failed to-apply-propersubstantiveJawand-failed 
to properly credit evidence of perfunctoriness, bad faith and hostility by Beyer and 
Coogan. Beattie's use of these words is just another way of stating a union's duty; they 
do not enlarge the Association's duty. It is well-settled that a union breaches its duty of 
fair representation only when its conduct toward a member of the bargaining unit is 
arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.10 The ALJ found that the Association had fairly 
represented Beattie throughout the District's investigation of the sexual harassment 
complaints. We find that Beyer's response to Beattie's February 2 letter was not 
improper. He made clear that the Association was prepared to represent her at the 
meeting with the Superintendent where the results of the investigation were to be made 
known and to then file Beattie's complaint with the Division of Human Rights if she was 
dissatisfied with the outcome. Beattie took it upon herself to retain private counsel 
9State of New York - Unified Court Sys., 28 PERB P004 (1995); City of 
Rochester, 23 PERB P049 (1990); United Fed'n of Teachers (Casid), 19 PERB 1J3061 
(1986); Hempstead Housing Auth., 12 PERB 1J3054 (1979); Captain's Endowment 
Ass'n, 10 PERB |[3034 (1977). See also Fashion Institute of Technology v. Helsby, 44 
A.D.2d 550, 7 PERB 1J7005 (1st Dep't 1974). 
10See Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Local 1000 v. PERB and Diaz, 132 A.D.2d 
430, 20 PERB ^7024 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 73 N.Y.2d 796, 21 PERB 
U7017(1988). 
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before either of the latter two events could occur. At the time Beattie hired a private 
attorney, the Association's duty to represent her in any further pursuit of her claims of 
sexual harassment or in defense of Levinthal's complaint against her ceased.11 
Beattie's claim that her complaint was handled in a perfunctory manner by Beyer 
L isnotsupportedby the record.— While the^processingota meritorious grievance4n.a- — 
perfunctory manner may evidence arbitrariness by a union representative,13 
perfunctoriness, itself, is not, as argued by Beattie, a separate and distinct basis for 
finding that the duty of fair representation has been breached. 
As to Coogan's remark that Beattie was crazy to hire a private attorney and that 
she could lose her house, there is simply nothing improper in either the timing or 
content of those statements. They did not affect the Association's representation of 
Beattie because Beattie had already retained private counsel. We do not read these 
statements as an attempt to intimidate or coerce Beattie, but merely as an expression 
of Coogan's incredulity that a union member would choose not to utilize the counsel 
11See Public Employees Fed'n (Levy), 31 PERB 1J3090 (1998). 
12The ALJ made certain findings in his decision in support of his determination 
that Beyer's handling of Beattie's complaint was not perfunctory but was "careful, caring 
and considerate," finding that Beyer believed that Beattie was a victim of spousal abuse 
and was acting accordingly. Beattie argues in her exceptions that these assumptions 
are baseless. Given the basis of our dismissal of the charge, it is not necessary for us 
to discuss this exception. By not discussing this exception, however, we do not 
suggest that there was any error by the ALJ in crediting the testimony of Beyer, 
Trobridge and Coogan on this point and in his findings in this regard. 
13See Jacobs v. Board ofEduc. ofE. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist. and Dreska, 
64 A.D.2d 148 (2nd Dep't 1978). 
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provided by the union, at no charge, and instead choose to pay a private attorney. The 
statement in no way violates the Act; it was merely the expression of an opinion by 
Coogan, which is not actionable. 
We hold, therefore, that the Association did not violate §209-a.2(c) of the Act. 
Based-oniheioregoing, we deny theexceptions and wa affirm thedecision^of 
theALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: March 23, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
-Marc A. Abbott, Memfjer 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
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INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
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TOWN OF DRYDEN, 
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JAMES N. McCAULEY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Dryden (Town) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
on a petition filed by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 317 
(Teamsters). The Teamsters seeks to represent a unit of all employees, except casual 
employees, of the Town Highway Department (Highway) and the Town Department of 
Public Works (DPW), including drivers, laborers, mechanics, maintenance employees, 
MEOs, heavy equipment operators and all other employees who regularly perform such 
work. The Town contended that this unit was not the most appropriate because the 
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DPW employees do not share a community of interest with the Highway employees. 
Pursuant to a stipulated record, the Director determined that the unit sought by the 
Teamsters was the most appropriate unit because the employees share common 
working rules, personnel practices, work environment, and salary and benefit structure. 
-The Town excepts totheDirector's decision,arguing-that the-Highwayand-DPW 
employees do not have the same salary or supervisors and do not perform the same 
job duties. The Teamsters argues that the Town's exceptions must be dismissed as 
they are untimely filed. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
We treat first with the Teamsters' argument that the Town's exceptions are 
untimely filed. The Town filed its exceptions within the time frame set forth in our Rules 
of Procedure (Rules); however, the exceptions were not mailed to the Board but to the 
Director. It is the Teamsters' argument, therefore, that the Town never properly filed 
exceptions with the Board and that it should not now be given leave to correctly file 
exceptions because the Board must strictly construe its Rules. 
The Teamsters' motion to dismiss the Town's exceptions is denied. Although 
§201.12 of the Rules specifies that exceptions to a decision of the Director are to be 
filed with the Board, they do not designate any specific agent for service. The Director 
is the Board's agent and may accept service of exceptions on the Board's behaif. As 
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the Town's exceptions were timely filed, albeit with the Director, and are in correct form, 
they are properly before the Board.1 
Turning to the merits of the exceptions, we find that they must be denied. As the 
Director found in his decision, the Highway employees earn between $12.90 and 
$13.40perhour. The DPAAtemployees^earnapproximately $1.00 more per hour, 
except when they are performing Highway Department work, when they earn $1.00 less 
an hour than they do when performing DPW work. The Highway and DPW employees 
are subject to the same work rules, receive a clothing allowance and report to the 
Highway Department building. While the Town argues in its exceptions that the 
Departments have separate supervisors, who set the salaries for their employees, the 
record shows that the Town's Highway Department Superintendent has, for at least the 
last few years, been designated annually as the DPW Superintendent. The same is 
true of the Deputy Highway Superintendent, who is designated as the Deputy DPW 
Superintendent. These unrepresented Highway and DPW employees, therefore, share 
the same supervisors, report to the same building, use some of the same equipment, 
and share, at least occasionally, the work of the Highway and DPW Departments. All 
the employees are blue-collar employees and have been classified by Civil Service as 
nonmpetitive, except for the laborers, who are in the labor class. Additionally, these 
1Birf cf. CSEA, Inc.(Juszczak), 22 PERB1J3020 (1989), where it was held that 
the filing of exceptions with the Director and not with the Board, when coupled with the 
other deficiencies in the exceptions, warranted the dismissal of the exceptions. 
2As of the date of the stipulation, there were two positions in the DPW; however, 
only one position was filled. 
^ Board - C-4740 -4 
' employees are subject to the same drug-testing policy and share the same 
opportunities for extra work and promotions. 
While there are some disparities in salary and specific work assignments, none 
of them are of the nature that would deny either party the opportunity for effective and 
meaningful negotiations orwould hinder-representation ofLthatwo-groups-otemployees -
were they joined in one unit. Any potential conflicts are clearly outweighed by the 
employees' community of interest. 
It has long been our policy to find that the most appropriate unit is the largest 
one which will permit for effective and meaningful negotiations.3 "Only diverse 
employee interests, either actual or potential, warrant the establishment of smaller 
^ units."4 Any differences in this case are minimal, at best. If there is a general 
community of interest, joinder is allowable for those having different occupational 
concerns and terms and conditions of employment so long as the potential for an actual 
conflict of interest is unlikely, as is the circumstance here.5 Moreover, the unit found by 
the Director to be most appropriate avoids a multiplicity of units and also avoids a 
possibility that the one remaining DPW employee would be left without representation.6 
3State of New York, 1 PERB 1J399.85 (1968). 
4Somers Cent. Sch. Dist, 12 PERB fi4016, at 4025, aff'd, 12 PERB 1J3068 
(1979). 
^Village of Skaneateles, 16 PERB 1J3070 (1983). 
6Town ofCarmel, 31 PERB ^3047 (1998); Auburn Ind. Dev. Auth., 15 PERB 
113139(1982). 
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Based on the foregoing, the Town's exceptions are denied, the Teamsters' 
motion to dismiss is denied, and the decision of the Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that there be a unit established of Town 
Highway Department and Department of Public Works employees as follows: 
Included:-All employees, except casualemployees,_of 
the Town of Dryden's Highway Department 
and Department of Public Works, including 
drivers, laborers, mechanics, maintenance 
employees, MEOs, heavy equipment 
operators and all other employees who 
regularly perform such work. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an election by secret ballot shall be held under 
~\ the direction of the Director among the employees in the unit determined herein to be 
appropriate and who were employed on the payroll date immediately preceding the 
date of this decision and order, unless the Teamsters submits to the Director within 
fifteen (15) working days from the date of receipt of this decision and order, evidence to 
satisfy the requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules of Procedure for certification 
without an election. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Town shall submit to the Director and the 
Teamsters within fifteen (15) working days from receipt of this decision and order, an 
alphabetized list of the names of all employees within the unit determined herein to be 
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appropriate who were employed on the payroll date immediately preceding the date of 
this decision and order. 
DATED: March 23, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
~ 4Aarc A. Abbott,Ivlember 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
petitionery 
-and- CASE NO. C-4742 
TOWN OF DOVER, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 456, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen And Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Deputy town clerk, clerk, assessor's aide, and secretary of the 
zoning board of appeals. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
EURIHER,_LTIS_QRDEHED_thatthe„aboye_named pubJlcemployer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen And Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 23, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-4840 
CLYDE-SAVANNAH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CLYDE-SAVANNAH CENTRAL SCHOOL CIVIL 
SERVICE ORGANIZATION (CSO), 
Intervener. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding1 having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
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-The petition filed was for an overall unit of non-instructional employees. The 
parties, thereafter, stipulated to the appropriateness of two units. 
-and-
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Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
_negotiations_andJhe_settlement of grievances
 ; 
Included: All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time employees employed 
in the following titles: teacher aide, food service helper, head cook, 
cleaner, custodian, store clerk, senior typist, receptionist. 
Excluded: Per-diem substitutes, secretary to superintendent, business office 
personnel and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating 
any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 23, 1999 
Albany, New York 
^Asu^t^j2-^~-^~' 
Ivjlejiael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
_ Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4840 
CLYDE-SAVANNAH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CLYDE-SAVANNAH CENTRAL SCHOOL 
TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEES 
ORGANIZATION (TEO), 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding- having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
-The petition sought to decertify the intervenor and was for an overall unit of 
non-instructional employees. The parties, thereafter, stipulated to the 
appropriateness of two units. 
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IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Clyde-Savannah Central School 
Transportation Employees Organization has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon 
by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
-collective, negotiations and the_settlementof_grievances 
Included: All bus drivers, bus monitors and bus mechanics. 
Excluded: Per-diem substitutes and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Clyde-Savannah Central School Transportation 
Employees Organization. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: March 23, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Marc A. Abbott, Member 
